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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN THE MATTER OF BOBBY E.
PANGBURN, ATTORNEY AT LAW,

)
)

------------------------------------------------------)
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Sup. Ct. Docket No.
38215-2010
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Petitioner-Respondent,

)

v.

)
)
)

BOBBY E. PANGBURN,

)
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BRlEF

)

Respondent-Appellant.

)

Appeal from the Hearing Committee, Professional Conduct Board, Idaho State
Bar, Randall R. Adams, Chairman.

Bob Pangburn
Appellant Pro Se
Post Office Box 2562
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I.

STANDARD ON REVIEW
In its brief, the Idaho State Bar provides its rendition of the appropriate Standard of

Review to be followed by this Court. As I understand it, the Idaho State Bar's primary
difference in characterization of the Standard of Review from mine is that the Idaho State Bar
suggests that trial court or civil court principles should apply to this case. This is incorrect.
This Court, in Matter ofJenkins, 120 Idaho 379, 384, 816 P.2d 335 (1991), rejected such
an analysis. It said, "in an attorney disciplinary action we are guided by different legal
principles which require our independent review of the record and assessment of the evidence."

The Court went on to say, "[i]n addition, in conducting our review and assessment of the record
we must apply the clear and convincing burden of proof standard historically required in attorney
disbarment and disciplinary actions. In re Campbell, 95 Idaho 87, 502 P.2d 1100 (1972); In re
Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P.2d 166 (1939); In re Baum, 32 Idaho 676,186 P. 927 (1920)."

[Emphasis added.] Civil or trial court principles are largely inapplicable in disciplinary cases
like this one.
In Matter ofJenkins, the Court also said, "While great weight should be accorded the
findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and Board, we cannot abdicate our
responsibility to independently review the record and make our own assessment and judgment of
the evidence as traditionally and consistently required of us by case law spanning decades. In re
Lutz, 100 Idaho 45, 592 P.2d 1362 (1979); In re Bowen, 95 Idaho 334, 508 P.2d 1240 (1973); In
re Baum, 32 Idaho 676, 186 P. 927 (1920). Disciplinary matters are judicial and not

administrative nor truly appellate in nature. The responsibility for assessing the facts and

ordering the sanctions to be imposed on an attorney ultimately rests with this Court." Matter of
Jenkins at 379. "Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence

indicating that the thing to proved is highly probable or reasonably certain." State v. Kimball,
145 Idaho 542, 546, 181 P.3d 468 (2008). Accordingly, while this Court should give great
weight to the Hearing Committee's recommendation, this Court is still obligated to assess the
evidence itself and verify that only "clear and convincing" evidence is used.

II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

a.

In the Robert Hall matter, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously when

it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA
Standards describing sanctions.
b.

In the Robert Illingworth, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously when

it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA
Standards describing sanctions.
c.

My Suspension Should Start January 31, 2008.

d.

The Idaho State Bar should be bound by its specific and repeated statements that a

suspension is the correct sanction in this case and that the suspension should begin on January
31,2008.
e.

The Hearing Committee ignored, or at least failed to fully acknowledge, my mitigation

evidence offered during the April 4, 2011 hearing.
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f.

This Court should follow the principles enumerated in prior discipline cases decided by

this Court.
g.

The manner in which the Supreme Court's rejected the stipulation between the Idaho

State Bar and me resolving this case violated my Due Process Rights.
h.

The Hearing Committee's decisions were too late.

III.

ARGUMENT

a.
In the Robert Hall matter, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to
correctly apply the ABA Standards describing sanctions.

As I stated in my Opening Brief, the central and most important aspect of the Robert Hall
matter is the Conflict ofInterest allegation. The other charges, 1.3 [lack of diligence] and S.4(d)
[engaging in actions prejudicial to the administration of justice], are factually based entirely on
the Conflict of Interest allegation. I admitted all three. The Conflict of Interest claim is really a
condition precedent for the other two charges. Functionally, the other two charges are wholly
included in the Conflict of Interest charge. In essence, without the Conflict of Interest charge, no
facts remain on which to base the other two. Accordingly, my analysis of an appropriate
sanction for my violation of all three charges began and ended with the Conflict of Interest
charge, as it should have. However, for the reasons stated below, when the 1.3 and S.4(d)
charges are evaluated on their own, the Hearing Committee's recommendation is still wrong.

II II /
II/II
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Lack of diligence is covered by ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanction 4.4.

4.4

LACK OF DILIGENCE

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon factors, ... , the following
sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client:

4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not
act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury
to a client.
The Hearing Committee had only my admissions in the Pre-Hearing Stipulation and the
letter from Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney as evidence with which to determine its sanction
recommendation for my violation of the diligence standard. Nothing, however, in that evidence
suggests that, as it relates to my diligence in representing Robert Hall, I did anything that would
justify more than a reprimand. There is no clear and convincing evidence in the record which
proves that I was any more than negligent nor that my actions caused any more than potential
injury to Mr. Hall.
The next more severe sanction is a suspension. It is covered by Section 4.42. Section
4.42 states:

4.42

Suspension is generally appropriate when:

(a)
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes
injury or potential injury to a client; or,
(b)
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential
injury to a client.
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There is not clear and convincing evidence in the record of this case that proves that I
neglected Mr. Hall's case in any way. This standard is inapplicable.
Engaging in actions prejudicial to the administration of justice is arguably covered by
ABA Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanction 6.1.

6.1

LACK OF DILIGENCE

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon factors, ... , the following
sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to
a court:
6.11 Disbarment if generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to
deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly
withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party,
or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false
statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is
improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential
injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect
on the legal proceeding.
The Commentary section of 6.12 states that "[ s]uspension is appropriate when a lawyer
has not acted with intent to deceive the court, but when he knows that material information is
being withheld and does not inform the court, .... " There is not clear and convincing evidence
in the record of this case which proves that I knew that material information was withheld from
the court. As I admitted, I was negligent in representing Mr. Hall when a conflict of interest
existed. Section 6.13 provides that negligence should subject a lawyer to a reprimand.
At the most, I should be given a sanction of a reprimand for my violation of the ethical
provision prohibiting the engaging in actions prejudicial to the administration of justice. Nothing
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in the record of this case justifies a more serious sanction. There is no evidence that I submitted
false documents to the court, either with or without the intent to deceive the court. I couldn't
have. I was APPOINTED to represent Mr. Hall during his post-conviction case by Judge Robert
Elgee. [Tr., P. 58, L. 1] (Located at R., P. 130)

Judge Elgee would not have appointed me

until AFTER he received Mr. Hall's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and supporting
documents. Nothing in the record of this case indicates that I was any more than negligent.
Further, the Hearing Committee was wholly incorrect in at least two ways relating to
Robert Hall. First, on pages 16 and 17 of its decision, the Hearing Committee, apparently
because of its confusion or failure to understand the post-conviction process here in Idaho, found
me to be "not credible" on the Robert Hall issue. The Hearing Committee said:
"7.

The Defendant [I'm the Respondent] asserts that he advised Hall that there was a

conflict of interest in representing him on his appeal as there was a potential issue regarding the
Defendant's own effectiveness as trial counsel. Although the Defendant also asserted that Hall
orally waived the conflict of interest, the Hearing Committee finds that this was not the case
because Hall raised ineffectiveness of trial counsel in his Affidavit in support of his pro se
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Defendant was not credible on this issue." This
statement is illogical. Robert Hall filed his Affidavit BEFORE I was appointed to represent him.
As I stated above and in my Opening Brief, I admit I was negligent in agreeing to
represent Mr. Hall when a conflict of interest existed. However, there is no evidence in this
record, and there certainly could have been if it existed, that Mr. Hall did not waive the conflict
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of interest as I testified that he orally did to me when I visited him at the Idaho correctional
facility south of Boise.
Also, the Hearing Committee created and utilized its own test for determining whether
my actions caused serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or caused a significant or
potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding. The Hearing Committee applied a
really somewhat bizarre standard by suggesting that because Mr. Hall ultimately was given Rule
35 sentence relief by Judge Elgee, that I adversely affected the legal proceeding. First, the
beneficiary of the hearing-indeed, the person who brought the post-conviction proceedingwas Mr. Hall. Any adverse effect had to be judged with regard to him and not the public. Also,
can't any successful work on an appeal or a criminal trial or any time ajudge gives a person a
sentence shorter that he or she could have given amount to exactly what the hearing Committee
states I did wrong? The Committee simply misapplied the ABA Standard here.
At least one point would considering is that there is no clear and convincing evidence at
all that I was ineffective. At page 26, paragraph 12 of the Hearing Committee Decision, this
point is important because the Committee states that I acted selfishly in representing Hall
because I "acted knowingly and intentionally, with the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result, i.e., the receipt and retention of professional fees, and the
concealment of his potential ineffective assistance as trial counsel." Such a conclusion is absurd
and unlawful, there is no evidence-certainly not clear and convincing evidence-that I was ever
paid for my work for Robert Hall. Equally, there is no evidence that I was ineffective. In fact,
there is no evidence that I did anything other than try to help a man whose case had been botched
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by court-appointed appellate counsel after I had worked tirelessly to create a very good appellate
record for them to work with. [R., 109]

b.
In the Robert Illingworth, the Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and
capriciously when it ignored relevant, competent and material evidence and failed to
correctly apply the ABA Standards describing sanctions.
My argument regarding this Count is fully and completely made in my Opening Brief. I
will not restate that information here. However, the Idaho State Bar does raise few points which
I should briefly explain and correct.
The Idaho State Bar describes as "incredulous" my describing the Illingworth matter as
fee dispute. This is unfair and ignores evidence in the record introduced by the Idaho State Bar.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 relates to Robert Illingworth's mother's claim with the Client Assistance
Fund. (Mr. Illingworth's mother's name is Mrs. Vermette.) In her claim, she demanded a return
of the entire $12,000 fee paid to me. The Fund committee awarded substantially less, after I
denied Mrs. Vermette's claims and requested a hearing. Mrs. Vermette's claim was notarized,
apparently by a relative, on July 26,2006. (Mr. Illingworth's letter firing me was dated two days
later. I would not have received it until after that date.) Also, in Idaho State Bar's Exhibit 2, are
numerous documents showing that Mr. Illingworth defamed me to at least one other client, a
fellow inmate of Mr. Illingworth as the Orofino prison. [Plaintiff s Exhibit 2]
I have repeatedly admitted that I could have handled the Illingworth matter better.
However, I did fee that I was under attack and I still believe that my feelings did have merit.

/ II II
/ II II
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c.

My Suspension Should Start January 31, 2008.

The period of suspension should start on January 31, 2008 and run concurrently with the
suspension I am currently serving. The plaintiff Idaho State Bar, through its attorney, Brad
Andrews, has repeatedly explained how and why a suspension should be imposed-both to the
Hearing Committee and to this Court. I would be hard pressed to name a person with more
expertise than Mr. Andrews in how disciplinary sanctions should be imposed; Mr. Andrews's
experience as to how sanctions have been imposed in just as extensive.
The reasons for beginning any sanction, whether suspension or disbarment, on January
31,2008 are logically and clearly described in the October 6,2010 Stipulation, drafted by Bar
Counsel, Mr. Andrews, and executed by Bar Counsel and me. (This Stipulation was approved
and recommended by the Hearing Committee, but rejected by this Court.) [R., 28-92, 93-95]
The Idaho State Bar said nothing in its arguments in its Respondent's Brief which should lead
anyone to believe that what the Idaho State Bar said in the Stipulation is now untrue.
The October 6, 2010 Stipulation is in the record of this case at two places. One place is
at pages 28 through 92 of the Record. The other place is at pages 88 through 100 of the Idaho
State Bar's Exhibit 9.
Paragraph 11 of the October 6, 2010 Stipulation states:
Bar Counsel and Respondent also discussed the unique procedural circumstances
relating to Respondent's suspension in 2008 following the conclusion of the reciprocal
disciplinary proceeding relating to his representation of clients in Oregon. Specifically,
the parties discussed that the professional misconduct alleged in Counts One and Two
[Illingworth and Hall] occurred prior to Respondent's suspension in 2008, but because
they were not reciprocal charges, they could not be included in that reciprocal
charge proceeding. .... Although the consequences of the professional misconduct
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were not conclusively determined until after Respondent began his suspension, the
professional misconduct underlying those two counts occurred prior to that
suspension. Given the rather unique procedural posture of these two cases, Bar Counsel
considered that, since it is common to include multiple allegations against a respondent
attorney relating to different representation during the general period of time that the
misconduct occurred, all of this conduct would normally have been considered
together in a non-reciprocal disciplinary case. In such circumstances, the maximum
suspension, disbarment or time for resignation in lieu of discipline, would be five
years. Since one of Respondent's cases was a reciprocal disciplinary case, thereby not
allowing for the inclusion of other unrelated professional misconduct charges, the
potential for a suspension for more than five years in these two cases did not seem
consistent with I.B.C.R. 506. Thus, the agreed upon resolution of this case takes into
account the prior disciplinary order and seeks to fashion a resolution of Respondent's
professional misconduct consistent with how other disciplinary respondents have
been treated ..... (Emphasis added.) [R.,33-34]
Probably the most important point made above is that to fail to start any period of
suspension or disbarment in January of2008 would result in my being treated in a manner NOT
"consistent with how other disciplinary respondents have been treated". Such treatment of me
would not comply with the Equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution.
"Every person is entitled to equal protection of the law, and equal protection of the law means
that equal protection and security shall be given to all under like circumstance in his life, his
liberty and his property and in the pursuit of happiness, and in the exemption from any greater
burdens and charges than are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances." Ex
Parte Knapp, 73 Idaho 505, 508,254 P.2d 411 (1953).

Whether I am disbarred or further suspended, the beginning point should be January 31,
2008. To do otherwise would cause me to be treated worse than other sanctioned lawyers under
similar circumstances-the Idaho State Bar and its attorney have said as much, repeatedly-and
this would violate constitutional guarantees of Equal protection.
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Also, my bad acts were done by me years before the Idaho State Bar filed its Complaint
in this case in 2010. The same is true of other events relating to when this case could have been
filed. I was appointed to represent Robert Hall before November 12,2004, the date I filed
Robert Hall's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. [R.,49] On March 7, 2007, the
Court of Appeals filed its opinion concluded that the appointment of me created a conflict that
directly resulted in the waiver of Robert's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. [R., 50]
On September 12,2007, the Client Assistance Fund Committee filed its recommendation to pay
Loretta Vermette. [R., 47]
Also relevant to any suspension or disbarment starting date is the fact that this Court filed
its order suspending me on January 17, 2008-AFTER the events that are the basis of this case.
In this Court's Disciplinary Order entered on January 17,2008, this Court stated: "Probation
should be imposed pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission 506( c). Probation under Rule 506(c) is
appropriate since there is little likelihood that Defendant will harm the public during the period
of probation and the conditions of probation can be adequately supervised by Bar Counsel's
office." [R.,43]

d.
The Idaho State Bar should be bound by its specific and repeated statements
that a suspension is the correct sanction in this case and that the suspension should begin
on January 31, 2008.
Before the Hearing Committee entered, first, its order recommending that I be disbarred,
and later, its order that my disbarment should be effective as of January 31, 2010, the Idaho State
Bar consistently and repeatedly stated that I should be further suspended, rather than be
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disbarred, and that any suspension should run from January 31,2008. In addition to drafting and
executing the Stipulation described in Section c., above, during the April 4, 2011 Hearing in this
case, the Idaho State Bar, through its attorney, stated no fewer than five times that I should be
suspended, rather than disbarred, and that my suspension should start January 31, 2008 in order
to be no more than a total of five years. [Ir., P. 138, L. 4-7; Ir., P. 138, L. 16-20; Ir., P. 139, L.
17-19; Ir., P. 161, L.15-18; Ir. P. 165, L. 10-12; Ir., P. 166, L. 3-5; Ir., P. 166,10-12] (Found
at R., pp. 150, 156 and 157) Repeatedly, Bar Counsel stated that any suspension I serve should
allow me to return to the practice oflaw on February of2013. Also, when it explained how a
disbarment would be calculated-if the Committee chose to recommend as much-the Idaho
State Bar stated that any disbarment period would likewise run from January 31, 2008.
Ihese statements were judicial admissions. "'A judicial admission is a statement made
by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of
dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact.' Sun Valley Potato
Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475.479 (2004). 'Ajudicial

admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within the
party's particular knowledge, not a matter oflaw ... [not] opinion.' 29A Am.Jur.2d, Evidence
Section 770 (1994)." In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242 (2007).
"Generally, judicial admissions remove the admitted facts from the field of controversy.
Perryv. Schaumann, 110 Idaho 596, 598, 716 P.2d 1368,1370 (Ct.App.1986); McLean [v. City
a/Spirit Lake), 91 Idaho [778] at 783, 430 P.2d at 674 [(1967)], 29A AMJUR.2d Evidence

section 770. Ihe party making a judicial admission is bound by the statement and may not
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controvert the statement on trial or appeal. 29 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE section 6726 (Interim Edition 1992);

see also McLean, 91 Idaho at 783, 430 P.2d at 674; Cloughley v. Orange Transportation Co., 80
Idaho 226, 230,327 P.2d 369,371 (1958." Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d
1361 (1997).
Until I raised the issue after the Hearing Committee issued its decision, the Idaho State
Bar had never even suggested that I should be subjected to a suspension or disbarment period
that started after January 31, 2008. It was not an issue. The Idaho State Bar did not raise the
issue in its Complaint. [R., 2-12] But, it did address the issue in the October 6, 2010 Stipulation
and during the April 4, 2011 hearing. [R., 33-34; Tr., P. 138, L. 4-7; Tr., P. 138, L. 16-20; Ir., P.
139, L. 17-19; Tr., P. 161, L.15-18; Ir. P. 165, L. 10-12; Ir., P. 166, L. 3-5; Ir., P. 166, 10-12]
(The transcript entries are found at R., pp. 150, 156 and 157) And, repeatedly and continuously
the Idaho State Bar stated that any sanction in this case should start on January 31, 2008.
Ihese statements were judicial admissions. Ihe Idaho State Bar should be not now be
able to argue a position contrary to them. Any sanction imposed upon me should start on
January 31, 2008.

e.
The Hearing Committee ignored, or at least failed to fully acknowledge my
mitigation evidence offered during the April 4,2011 hearing.
In my Opening Brief, I included in the Statement of Facts section pages of mitigation
evidence which the Hearing Committee apparently failed to consider. It certainly did not discuss
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it in the one-half page (of its thirty-page-Iong decision) in which it said anything about my
mitigation evidence.
The Hearing Committee provided no further analysis of my mitigation evidence in its
decision on my Motion to Alter or Amend. Also, despite the Idaho State Bar's contention to the
contrary, the Committee's merely saying that it did something, is not evidence that it actually did
it.

f.

Prior cases.

I have adequately and completely covered this issue in my Opening Brief. However, I
shouldn't need to remind the Court--but I will--that the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution requires that my sanctions be consistent with those imposed upon other attorneys
under similar circumstances.

g.
The way the Supreme Court's rejected the stipulation between the Idaho
State Bar and me resolving this case violated my Due Process Rights.
On October 6, 2010, the Idaho State Bar and I executed and filed with this Court a
stipulation resolving this case.[R., 28-92] On November 30, 2010, this Court rejected the
stipulation with an order to the Hearing Committee directing it to "reconsider the imposition of
more significant sanctions." [R., 184] Purportedly, the sanctions described in the stipulation
were not adequate. However, when this Court executed this order, it did so without a hearing,
without a complete record and without the benefit of briefing.
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"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation
in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners ofNew Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,
_

S.Ct. _

(1957). [Emphasis added.] "The essence of due process is the right to be heard at

a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96
S. Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); .... " State, Bureau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, 132
Idaho 505, 510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Idaho App, 1999). "[T]he decisionmaker's conclusion as to
a [person's] eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene &

s. R. Co., 265 U.S.

264,288-289 (1924). To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decision
maker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, cf
Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48,57-59 (1922), .... " Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254,271, _

S.Ct. _

(1970).

Effectively, when the Court executed its "more significant sanctions" order, it told the
Hearing Panel, the Idaho State Bar and Bar Counsel, Brad Andrews, to get tougher. It can not be
denied that when this Court said "reconsider the imposition of more significant sanctions," it did
so without giving me a hearing. How can this procedure be in compliance with Due Process
requirements for a hearing?
The Due Process violation does come from the fact that this Court rejected the
stipulation. It could do that. The Due Process violation arises from the manner in which the
Court rejected it. And, the Idaho State Bar's argument that my Due Process rights were not
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violated because this Court is charged with the ultimate responsibility of assessing facts and
ordering discipline is unsound. If the Hearing Committee followed the "reconsider the
imposition of more significant sanctions" order, which it obviously did, decisions were made in
this case by both this Court and by the Hearing Committee before I was given a hearing. Again,
how can such a procedure comply with Constitutional Due Process requirements?
The Idaho State Bar's argument that an "eventual" hearing is good enough is also
unsound. A flawed hearing, that is, a hearing that follows this Court's order as to what to do,
still fails to comply with Due Process.
The Constitution's Due Process provisions require that I have a "right to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" (State, Bureau of Child Support Services v.
Garcia, 132 Idaho at 510) and that the Hearing Committee's decision be based solely on the

legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 at 271). When
this Court, without hearing evidence, gives any "starting point" directions to the Hearing
Committee and then gives "great weight" to that Hearing Committee's subsequent
recommendation, I have not been given the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner and to have the Hearing Committee's decision be based solely on evidence
adduced at my hearing.
The manner in which this Court rejected the settlement stipulation in this case and its
giving pre-hearing instructions to the Hearing Committee violated my Due Process rights as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
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h.

The Hearing Committee's decisions were too late.

Idaho Bar Commission Rule 511 (h) says:
Hearing Committee Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. In every Formal
Charge case assigned to it, the Hearing Committee shall issue its findings of fact, conclusions of
law and recommendations.
Service on Parties. The Hearing Committee shall send to the Clerk, who shall
(1)
serve upon all parties, the findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and recommendations within 28
days following the conclusion of the hearing. (Emphasis added.)
Idaho Bar Commission Rule 511 (h) also states:
(2)
Motion to alter or Amend. A motion to alter or amend the findings and
recommendations of a Hearing Committee may be filed by either party, not later than 14 days
after those findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations have been served upon the
parties.
I.B.C.R. 511 (h) also states:
The Hearing Committee shall consider the motion and shall, within 14 days of receipt
of the motion:
(A)
alter or amend its findings its findings of facts, conclusions of law, and
recommendations;
(B)
deny the motion; or
(C)
schedule the motion for hearing. (Emphasis added.)

The Hearing Committee's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the April
4,2011 hearing, held after this Court's "reconsideration" order, was filed with the Clerk of the
Professional Responsibility on July 27, 2011, eighty-six days late. [R.,183-213] I timely filed
my Motion to Alter or Amend on August 11,2011. [R.,214] The Hearing Committee's action
(altering or amending or denying or scheduling for hearing) was due no later than August 25,
2011. It was filed with the Clerk of the Professional Responsibility on November 9, 2011,
seventy-six days late. [264-268]
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A State may not exclude a person from the practice of law in a manner that violates the
Due Process guarantees of the United States Constitution. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners
of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,238, _

S.Ct.

(1957). As stated in Section h. above, "The

essence of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333,96 S.Ct. 893,47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); .... " State,
Bureau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, l32 Idaho 505, 510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Idaho App,

1999). Also, "[t]he decisionmaker's conclusion as to a [person's] eligibility must rest solely on
the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292
(1937); United States v. Abilene &

s.

R. Co., 265 U.S. 264, 288-289 (1924). To demonstrate

compliance with this elementary requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, cf Wichita R. & Light Co. v. PUc, 260
U.S. 48,57-59 (1922), .... " Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,271, _

S.Ct. _

(1970).

Unlike Idaho state statutes which are apparently written by legislators from all walks of
life, logically, the Idaho Bar Commission Rules were written by members of the Idaho State Bar,
i.e., lawyers. Equally logically, when those lawyers chose to use the term "shall" when they
wrote LB.C.R. 511, they did so for a reason. A reasonable argument is that they used "shall"
because they meant shall.
The Idaho State Bar first points out that the Idaho Bar Commission Rules state that "the
time in which any act or anything is to be done or performed is not jurisdictional." LB.C.R.
525(i). Apparently, the Bar's argument is that unlike most instances when things have to be
done on time for a court or agency to acquire jurisdiction, the hearing Committee does not lose
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jurisdiction by being late, even very late. The Idaho State Bar's argument misses the point.
Merely complying with rules, even those relating to jurisdiction, does not mean that a Hearing
Committee's actions complied with Due Process requirements. The procedures outlined in the
rules must comply with Due Process. Schware, 353 U.S. 232. "Jurisdictional" is not necessarily
"constitutional" .
When Committees (and courts) produce very late decisions, they risk forgetting evidence
and certainly give the impression of a decision that is incorrect and does not comply with the
rules. (As stated in Section e. above, the Hearing Committee did fail to discuss, and apparently
fail to consider, significant amounts of mitigation evidence and because of the Committee's
failure to discuss, in any meaningful detail, my mitigation evidence, there is no evidence that
they considered it or even remembered it.)
Also, without citing any legal justification, the Idaho State Bar claims that I must produce
evidence that I was prejudiced by the Committee's delay. First, I have shown prejudice when I
pointed out that the Committee failed to discuss my mitigation evidence. Next, I certainly could
not have entered evidence into the record during the April 4, 2011 hearing to justify the prejUdice
I would suffer in the future as the result of the Committee's repeated late actions.
When the Hearing Committee failed to prepare and file timely decisions in this case, it
failed to comply with the Due Process requirements that procedures result in meaningful
hearings (and apparently meaningful decisions) in a meaningful manner. And, it certainly
doesn't help make things better when those late decisions fail to specifically mention mitigation
evidence provided to the Committee during the hearing.
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The Hearing Committee's decisions were so late as to violate Due Process.

IV.

CONCLUSION
The Hearing Committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it ignored relevant,

competent and material evidence and failed to correctly apply the ABA Standards describing
sanctions. The correct ABA Standards for Imposing Attorney Discipline call for no more than a
reprimand in the Hall matter and a suspension in the Illingworth matter.
Any suspension should begin January 31, 2008 and the Idaho State Bar should not now
be allowed to argue against this. It has clearly and repeatedly explained to the Hearing
Committee and to this Court that this is the appropriate sanction. Its previous statements are
judicial admissions and it is bound not to argue against them now.
The Hearing Committee failed to properly consider my mitigation evidence when it
formulated its recommendation regarding the sanction I should serve. This, too, was arbitrary
and capricious.
This Court should not accord any weight to the Hearing Committee's sanction
recommendation. The hearing Committee's were so late as to violate the U.S. Constitution's
guarantees of Due Process.
Finally, this Court, too, violated my Due Process rights when, without a hearing, the
benefit of briefing or a complete record, it rejected the stipulation of the Idaho State Bar and me

/1/1/
/1/1/
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resolving this case and directed the Hearing Committee and Bar Counsel to proceed to enter
"more significant sanctions" upon me.
DATED this 12th day of June, 2012.

I hereby certify that two copies of this brief were served on the plaintiff's attorney, Brad
Andrews, POBox 895, Boise, ID 83701, on this date, by mailing them to him by U Sail,
postage prepaid.
DATED this 12th day of June, 2012.
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